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Once the Board issues a cease-and-desist order, the
offending party must post a notice that it violated the Act
and will not repeat those violations.
M ANY BUSINESS DECISIONS result agreement, some have that effect but
in work transfer. Some are un- are lawful, and others are economi-
lawful designs to avoid unions or obli- caly motivated business decisions un-
gations under a collective bargaining related to employee self-organization.
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is derived from a chapter in the authors' new book,
LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (ALI-ABA, Philadelphia, 2d ed.
1986). Part 1 of this article appeared in the March issue of THE PRACTicAL
LAWYER and discussed the general statutory restrictions on employer interfer-
ence with employee organizing attempts.
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These decisions may have significant
duty-to-bargain implications and
some may constitute unlawful em-
ployer discrimination.
R UNAWAY SHOP AND PLANT CLOS-
INGS * The "runaway shop," ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, entails
an employer "transfer[ring] its work
to another plant or open[ing] a new
plant in another locality to replace its
closed plant." Textile Workers Union
v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263,
272-73 & n.16 (1965). They clearly vi-
olate section 158(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act ("Act") when ini-
tiated:
*To discourage union membership;
* To punish unionized employees for
exercising rights protected by section
157;
* Tb evade the duty to bargain;
* Or otherwise to run away from the
union. See In re Jacob H. Klotz, 13
N.L.R.B. 746 (1939).
(Unless otherwise indicated, all sec-
tion references will be to the Act, as
codified in 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq.) A
more difficult case arises if the em-
ployer demonstrates sound economic
reasons but has also manifested hos-
tility toward the union.
The principles enunciated in NLRB
v. Transp. Management Corp., 462
U.S. 393 (1983), control analysis of
"mixed motive" section 158(a)(3)
cases arising in employee discipline
contexts and seemingly would also
now control a mixed motive runaway
shop case. Cf NLRB v. Rapid Bind-
ery, Inc., 293 E2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961)
(plant relocation one month after
union certification seen as mixed mo-
tive case). The subcontracting of em-
ployees' work presents the functional
equivalent to the "runaway shop."
The employer remains stationary but
the bargaining unit work is trans-
ferred to another employer. When
discriminatorily motivated, this con-
duct also violates section 158(a)(3).
See Universidad Interamericana de
Puerto Rico, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1171
(1984).
Alter Ego
Alter ego cases raise an additional
complexity. Historically, they arose
when the employer nominally ceased
doing business by dissolving an ex-
isting company but then transferred
bargaining unit work to another busi-
ness the same employer controlled.
More recently "double-breasted" op-
erations have raised alter ego ques-
tions: a unionized company creates
a second nonunion company and
transfers bargaining unit work to it.
Alter ego transactions violate section
158(a)(3) when the new entity is simply
the "disguised continuance" of the
former and has been established to de-
feat employees' section 157 rights.
Compare Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B.
664 (1965), enforced in part, 374 E2d
295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denie, 387 U.S.
942 (1967) (alter ego found) with B&B
Industries, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 832,
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835 n.4 (1967) (alter ego not found).
For a summary of the factors that the
Board considers in determining alter
ego status, see Crawford Door Sales
Co., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976).
The Afdwaukee Spring Doctrine
A recent development regarding
work transfer and unlawful discrimi-
nation involves the Los Angeles Ma-
rine Hardware Co. doctrine, 235
N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602
E2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979). Because of
its revival, explication, and demise in
Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil
Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982),
rev'd, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), en-
forced sub nom. Automobile Workers
v. NLRB, 765 E2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1985), it is now more commonly re-
ferred to as the Milwaukee Spring
doctrine.
In Milwaukee Spring, without the
union's consent the employer trans-
ferred an assembly operation from
its unionized facility to an unorgan-
ized facility in a different city during
the term of a collective agreement.
This resulted in the layoff of union-
ized employees. The parties stipu-
lated that both facilities were a single
employer and that the decision to
transfer work was not the result of
antiunion animus but rather was eco-
nomically motivated to avoid the rel-
atively higher wage costs in the union
contract. In these circumstances, the
National Labor Relations Board
("Board") found a section 158(a)(3)
violation in Milwaukee Spring I, rea-
soning that since the work transfer
was designed to avoid the contract's
wage provisions and thereby deny
the unionized employees the fruits of
collective bargaining, the employer's
conduct was "inherently destructive"
of employee rights. Cf Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 112 L.R.R.M. 1437 (Ad-
vice Memorandum from NLRB
General Counsel, March 2, 1983) (no
Milwaukee Spring violation when
employer relocated a small portion
of bargaining unit work as part of
overall consolidation solely to en-
hance operational efficiency).
Milwaukee Spring H
In Milwaukee Spring II, the Board,
in a split decision, reversed itself,
holding that because the employer
complied with statutory bargaining
obligations before deciding to trans-
fer the work, the work transfer and
subsequent layoff were not "inher-
ently discriminatory." Accordingly, no
inference of unlawful motive was
warranted. In the foreseeable future
the Board can be expected to find that
the transfer of work and the layoff of
bargaining unit employees to avoid
contractual economic obligations do
not constitute section 158(a)(3) con-
duct absent proof by a preponderence
of the evidence of an intent to retali-
ate against employees for their pro-
tected activities. It is premature to
speculate what, if any, effect this de-
velopment will have on the double-
breasted cases, previously discussed,
which also entail work transfers to
78 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER (Vol. 33-No. 3)
avoid wage implications in collective
bargaining contracts.
E MPLOYER'S RIGHT TO MANAGE
BUSINESS? * Plant closings, like
work transfers, have also involved the
employer's right to manage its busi-
ness without restraint. The landmark
case is Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965). The union had won an elec-
tion in September, and one week later
the board of directors voted to liqui-
date the corporation, a move that was
accomplished by November. The
Board found that since the closing
was motivated by antiunion animus,
it violated section 158(a)(3). The court
of appeals refused to enforce the or-
der, ruling that an employer may close
all or part of its operation for any rea-
son, including antiunion animus. The
Supreme Court held that an employer
has an absolute right to close its entire
business, regardless of motive, but
that a partial closing motivated by
antiunion animus may violate section
158(a)(3).
For the Court the proposition that
a single businessperson or company
cannot choose to go out of business
completely, regardless of motivation,
represented such a startling innova-
tion that it could not be entertained
without the clearest manifestation of
legislative intent or unequivocal judi-
cial precedent. The Court's reasoning
was that a complete liquidation of
business yields no future benefit for
the employer if the termination is in
good faith and that the personal satis-
faction an employer may derive from
standing on its beliefs or the mere
probability that other employers will
follow its example is too remote to be
considered a danger at which the la-
bor statute is aimed.
By dictum, the Court noted that its
decision would not permit an em-
ployer to "threaten" to close its plant
but acknowledged that it may "an-
nounce a decision already reached"
that it would close if the employees
vote for the union. An employer de-
termined to defeat unionization can
thus make a "definite decision" before
the election and advise the employees
accordingly. If the employees take the
announcement seriously and vote
against the union, the sincerity of the
decision cannot be tested. If the em-
ployees gamble that the employer is
bluffing and vote for the union, the
employer can continue operations.
Although the Board could find that
the employer's announcement of the
definite decision was in reality an un-
lawful threat and hence a section
158(a)(1) violation, its cease-and-
desist order will be quite painless for
the employer and quite ineffective for
the employees and the union.
Partial Closing vs.
Complete Liquidation
A partial closing was distinguished
from a complete liquidation of busi-
ness because the former may result in
future benefits for the employer by
discouraging its other employees
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from exercising their section 157
rights. The Court therefore held that
"a partial closing is an unfair labor
practice under § I 58(a)(3) if motivated
by a purpose to chill unionism in any
of the remaining plants of the single
employer and if the employer may
reasonably have foreseen that the
closing would likely have that effect."
380 U.S. at 275. Further, an organiza-
tional integration of locations or cor-
porations is not a prerequisite for this
rule to apply. The closing of one loca-
tion or any part of it for antiunion
reasons is unlawful if:
*The persons exercising control have
an interest in another business, wheth-
er or not affiliated with, or engaged
in, the same line of business as the
closed operation, of sufficient sub-
stantiality that they will benefit from
discouraging unionization in that
business;
e The closing is for the purpose of
producing such a result; and
* The persons involved occupy a re-
lationship to the other business that
makes it realistically foreseeable that
employees of that business might fear
that it, too, may be closed if they per-
sist in organizational activities.
The Court did sustain the Board's
finding in Darlington that there had
been a partial, not a total, closing,
since the dissolved corporation had
been controlled by a larger corporate
enterprise.
The Board has emphasized that
evidence of an actual "chilling effect"
on employees at remaining plants
need not be proved; only a finding of
its reasonable foreseeability is re-
quired. George Lithograph Co., 204
N.L.R.B. 431 (1973).
R ETALIATION RELATED TO EN-
FORCEMENT OF LEGAL RIGHTS *
Section 158(a)(4) prohibits any em-
ployer from discharging or otherwise
discriminating against an employee
because he or she has filed charges or
given testimony under the Act. This
section has generated little litigation
over the years, but the Supreme Court
has interpreted it to encompass giving
a sworn statement to a Board field ex-
aminer investigating an unfair labor
practice charge filed against an em-
ployer. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S.
117, 122 (1972).
Although discrimination for giving
sworn statements did not fall within
the literal prohibition of section
158(a)(4), the legislative history sup-
ports the view that it should be read to
"prevent the Board's channels of in-
formation from being dried up by
employer intimidation of prospective
complainants . . . ." Similar consid-
erations militate in favor of extending
the protection of section 158(a)(4) to
employees coerced by employers to
give false testimony, or any testimony,
in support of the employer's position
at an unfair labor practice hearing.
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees
Union, Local 876, 570 E2d 586, 591-
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92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
819 (1978) (prohibiting coercion of
employees who refuse to testify vol-
untarily in support of discrimination
position is rational means of guarding
against coercing employees to give
NLRB false or misleading testimony).
In short, "section 158(a)(4) by itself
neither encourages or discourages tes-
timony: it simply leaves employees
free to choose their actions before the
Board without fear of employer re-
prisals." Id.
Freedom of Choice Principle
The freedom of choice principle
underlying section 158(a)(4) may be
jeopardized seriously by a retaliatory
lawsuit brought by an employer
against employees to impede their ex-
ercising rights guaranteed by the Act.
The Supreme Court has recognized
that by suing an employee who files
charges with the Board or engages in
other protected activities, "an em-
ployer can place its employees on no-
tice that anyone who engages in such
conduct is subjecting himself to the
possibility of a burdensome lawsuit
.... mhe chilling effect... is mul-
tiplied where the complaint seeks
damages . .." Bill Johnson's Res-
taurants Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,
740, 741 (1983). It is plain, however,
that a fundamental first amendment
value is access to courts, both state
and federal, for redress of alleged
wrongs. Id. at 742-43. Thus filing a
well-founded lawsuit is protected by
the Constitution, irrespective of any
retaliatory motive. Id. Prosecution of
baseless litigation is not so protected.
Therefore, the Board may find the
filing of a lawsuit a violation of the
Act upon a showing that:
* The lawsuit was filed to retaliate
against the exercise of statutory
rights; and
o The lawsuit lacked a reasonable ba-
sis in law or fact. Id. at 744-46.
This principle clearly applies in sec-
tion 158(a)(4) contexts. J. W. Rhodes
Dept. Stores, 267 N.L.R.B. 381
(1983); cf. Access Control Systems,
270 N.L.R.B. 823 (1984). The princi-
ple also applies to union interference
with section 157 rights or rights of em-
ployers recognized by national labor
policy. See Sheet Metal Workers, Lo-
cal355 v. NLRB, 716 E2d 1249, 1260
& n.Il (9th Cir. 1983).
R EMEDIES o Section 160(c) of the
Act empowers the Board to rem-
edy unfair labor practices by issuing
cease-and-desist orders and by requir-
ing violators "to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of em-
ployees,with or without backpay, as
will effectuate the purposes of this
Act." The Board requires the offend-
ing party to post a notice reciting that
it has been found to have violated the
Act and has been ordered to post the
notice and keep its word about what it
says it will do. The notice then details
the specific acts that the party will not
do, the affirmative action it will take,
and the rights of the parties.
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The Board's General Counsel now
also routinely seeks inclusion of a visi-
torial clause in all Board remedial or-
ders. Secured to help monitor compli-
ance with court enforced Board
orders, it authorizes Board agents to
obtain discovery from respondents to
determine or secure compliance. The
discovery is conducted under the su-
pervision of the United States Court
of Appeals enforcing the order. See
NLRB, General Counsel, Inclusion of
Visitorial Clauses in the Board's Reme-
dial Orders (Memorandum GC 85-5,
Sept. 23, 1985), reprinted in 120 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 137 (Oct. 14, 1985).
In unusual cases involving isolated
and technical violations of the Act,
the Board is empowered not to issue a
remedial order. That decision is for
the Board and not the courts. Cham-
pion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. NLRB,
717 E2d 845, 853 n.9 (3d Cir. 1983);
see also Safeway Stores, Inc., 266
N.L.R.B. 1124, 1124-25&n.2 (1983).
Cease-and-Desist,
Reinstatement, Backpay
The simple cease-and-desist order
is generally the only remedy for viola-
tions of sections 158(a)(1) and
158(b)(1)(A). To remedy section
158(a)(2) violations, the Board orders
the disestablishment of an employer-
dominated union or the withdrawal
of recognition from a union with
which the employer has unlawfully in-
terfered through assistance or other
means and, in appropriate cases, ab-
rogation of an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement and reimburse-
ment of union dues and fees. Rein-
statement, backpay, or both are the
traditional remedies for violations of
sections 158(a)(3), 158(b)(2), and
158(a)(4). In recent years the Board,
in unlawful discipline cases, has
added a requirement that an em-
ployer expunge from its records all
references to the unlawful discipline.




When an employer and union have
been found to have violated section
158(a)(3) and section 158(b)(2), re-
spectively, they are held jointly and
severally liable for any backpay
awarded. Int'l Harvester Co., 270
N.L.R.B. 1342 (1984). Backpay in-
cludes fringe benefits, and discrimi-
natorily discharged employees receive
interest on their awards equal to the
"adjusted prime rate"-that used by
the Internal Revenue Service to calcu-
late the interest due on overpayments
or underpayments of federal taxes.
See Forida Steel Corp., 231 N.L.R.B.
651 (1977), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 586 E2d 436 (5th Cir.
1978).
Backpay liability continues until an
unequivocal and unconditional offer
of reinstatement is clearly communi-
cated to an unlawfully discharged em-
ployee. Hickory's Best, Inc., 267
N.L.R.B. 1274 (1983); see also Mor-
vay v. Maghielse Tool & Die Co., 708
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E2d 229 (6th Cir. 1983) (collecting
cases). Reversing 30 years of prece-
dent, the Board held in Sheet Metal
Workers Union, Local 355 (Zinsco
Electrical Products), 254 N.L.R.B.
773 (1981), enforced in relevant part,
716 E2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1983), that
when a union is solely liable for an
unlawful discharge, it will be solely li-
able for backpay suffered until the
employee discharged is reinstated by
the employer or obtains similar em-
ployment elsewhere. As a practical
matter, if a union is unable to per-
suade an employer to reinstate a dis-
charged employee, backpay liability
might continue indefinitely, unless the
union finds the discharged employee
a substantially equivalent job.
Migation of Damages Requirement
In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941), in addition to
sustaining an order requiring the ini-
tial hiring of applicants who had been
discriminatorily refused employment
because of their union activities, the
Supreme Court ruled that the doc-
trine of mitigation of damages must
be applied in computing backpay. A
discriminatee is, therefore, obligated
to make a reasonably diligent search
for suitable interim employment, but
registration with federal and state em-
ployment agencies does not fulfill the
obligation.
The Board generally has held that
dischargees need seek and accept only
employment substantially equivalent
to their previous positions and are not
under a duty "to lower their sights."
But courts of appeals, on occasion,
have taken the position that after a
reasonable period of time dischargees
are required to seek interim, suitable
employment outside their regular
craft or occupation. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F2d
1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The burden of proof on the issue of
failure to mitigate rests with the em-
ployer. If an employee willfully con-
ceals earnings from interim employ-
ment, backpay may be denied for all
calendar quarters in which the con-
cealment occurred. See Am. Naviga-
tion Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 426 (1983);
see also Alumbaugh Coal Corp. v.
NLRB, 635 E2d 1380 (8th Cir. 1980)
(postdischarge misconduct may de-
prive discriminatorily discharged em-
ployee either reinstatement or back-
pay) (collecting cases).
Compliance Proceedings
Once a backpay order is issued and
enforcement granted, a compliance
proceeding begins, and a backpay
specification is formulated that de-
tails the exact amounts of backpay
due. In the course of compliance pro-
ceedings the Board must tailor "the
remedy to suit the individual circum-
stances of each discriminatory dis-
charge." Sure Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467
U.S. 883, 901-902 & n. 11 (1984). Even
if the Board inordinately delays in
formulating the backpay specifica-
tion, the courts must enforce the
backpay order. Otherwise, wronged
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employees would be punished for the
Board's nonfeasance. NLRB v. Iron-
workers Local 480, 466 U.S. 720
(1984).
Difficult Remedial Problems
Runaway shops and plant closings
that violate the Act create difficult re-
medial problems. It is often impractical
to order a return to the old location, a
reopening of a plant, or even reestab-
lishment of an operation discriminato-
rily terminated. See, e.g., Hood Indus.
Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 1587 (1985)
(Board rescinds order to reestablish op-
eration because status quo ante remedy
would endanger employer's continued
economic viability).
In In re Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B.
746 (1939), the runaway employer
was ordered to pay either the moving
expenses of the employees to the new
location or their commuting ex-
penses. The Board has also ordered a
runaway employer to reinstate the
employees at the new location with
backpay and to reimburse them for
expenses incurred in moving. Indus-
trial Fabricating Inc., 119 N.L.R.B.
162 (1957) aff'd as NLRB v. Mack-
neish, 272 E2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959). Al-
though in Garwin Corp., 153
N.L.R.B. 664 (1965), the Board di-
rected a runaway shop employer to
bargain with the union at its new loca-
tion, the court of appeals refused to
enforce the order on the ground that
it interfered with the section 157 rights
of the nonunion employees at the new
location. Local57, ILG WU v. NLRB,
374 E2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
In the Darlington case upon re-
mand, after the partial closing had
been found unlawful, the liquidated
corporation and its affiliated corpo-
rations were held jointly and severally
liable for backpay due employees
from the time their jobs had been ter-
minated until they obtained substan-
tially equivalent employment or were
placed on a preferential hiring list by
the companies. Darlington Mfg. Co.,
165 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1967), enforced,
397 E2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969). The Board
has also ordered an employer found
to have unlawfully closed a profitable
division of the company for the pur-
pose of chilling unionization to reo-
pen the division. George Lithograph
Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 431 (1973). This
holding applies the general rule that
the proper remedy for discriminatory
conduct is resumption of the status
quo unless the wrongdoer can dem-
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onstrate that the normal remedy
would cause "undue economic hard-
ship" endangering its "continued
viability." See Monongahela Steel Co.
& Youngstown Steel Corp., 265
N.L.R.B. 262 (1982).
Recidivifts vs. First Offenders
In fashioning remedies, the Board
takes into consideration whether the
respondent is a recidivist rather than a
first offender. If the circumstances so
warrant, the Board may issue a broad
cease-and-desist order that covers
both the unlawful activity found in
the case and "similar" misconduct or
that proscribes violation of the Act
"in any other manner" or with respect
to "any other" employer, union, or
employees. See, e.g., Union Nacional
de Tabajadores (Catalytic Industrial
Maintenance Co. Inc.), 219 N.L.R.B.
414 (1975), affd, 540 E2d 1 (1st Cir.
1976) (unions found to have procliv-
ity to engage in violence and threats of
violence ordered to cease and desist
from restraining or coercing employ-
ees of any employer in Puerto Rico).
The breadth of a court-enforced
Board order can be significant be-
cause the Board has the option of in-
stituting a contempt proceeding in the
event of subsequent allegedly unlaw-
ful activity by the party to whom the
order runs.
When an employer has committed
massive, pervasive, and flagrant vio-
lations of sections 158(a)(1) and
158(a)(3), the Board has sought to de-
velop more effective remedies to over-
come the effects of an unlawful anti-
union campaign. This is best il-
lustrated by the series of cases arising
out of the effort by the Textile Work-
ers Union to organize J.P. Stevens &
Co., and the company's full-scale
campaign against unionization and
persistence in flouting the law. In vio-
lation of section 158(a)(3), it dis-
charged scores of union adherents,
and in violation of section 158(a)(4), it
discharged other employees who testi-
fied at Board proceedings. Moreover,
the company engaged in unlawful
surveillance, interrogations, threats,
and other tactics violative of section
158(a)(1). As case after case was
heard, first by the Board and then by
various courts of appeals -the Board
decided 12 cases in five years -the
Board and the courts became increas-
ingly impatient with the company and
resorted to more stringent remedies.
Most of the cases are collected in J.R
Stevens& Co., Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 751
n.3 (1971); see also Textile Workers
Union of Am. AFL-CIO v. NLRB,
547 E2d 792 (4th Cir. 1976).
Among the remedies invoked were
the requirements that:
e The usual notice be mailed to all
employees in a two-state area, as well
as posted on all plant bulletin boards
in a three-state area;
* That the notice be read by a com-
pany official or a Board agent during
working time to all assembled em-
ployees at the plants where unfair la-
bor practices had been committed;
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* That the company furnish the
union with a list of the names and ad-
dresses of the employees at such
plants;
* That the union be permitted limited
access to company premises to make
speeches to assembled employees on
company time under certain circum-
stances; and
* That supervisors be given written
instructions to comply with court or-
ders.
In one case, in which the company
and a number of its agents were
found in civil contempt for refusal to
obey previous orders, the company
was also ordered to pay all costs and
expenses incurred by the Board in
preparing and prosecuting the con-
tempt proceedings. NLRB v. J.P
Stevens & Co., Inc., 464 E2d 1326 (2d
Cir. 1972).
Similarly, extraordinary remedies
have been invoked against recalci-
trant recidivist unions. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Union Nacional de 7Rabaja-
dores, 540 E2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) (union
decertified because of violent miscon-
duct and required at its expense to
publish Board notice to employees in
all Puerto Rican papers of general cir-
culation as well as any union newspa-
per); Teamsters Local 901, 193
N.L.R.B. 591 (1971) (union required
to mail copy of Board's notice, in En-
glish and Spanish, to all employees).
S COPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW e Re-medial issues often raise questions
of the appropriate function and scope
of judicial review. The courts of ap-
peals have authority under sections
160(e) & (f) of the Act "to make and
enter a decree ... modifying, and en-
forcing as so modified," the orders of
the Board. Yet, clearly, they "should
not substitute their judgment for that
of the Board in determining how best
to undo the effects of unfair labor
practices . . . ." Sure Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 899 (1984). The
line between permissible modification
and unwarranted substitution of judg-
ment is not always clear. That line is
deemed to have been crossed, how-
ever, when a court expands the
Board's original remedial order in
contexts requiring the Board's "in-
formed judgment... superior exper-
tise and long experience in handling
specific details of remedial relief." Id.
at 905. If a reviewing court believes a
Board remedy to be inadequate, the
proper course is to remand the case of
the Board for further consideration.
Id. at 900 n. 10; see also NLRB v. Food




Finally, the Board has increasingly
added section 160(j) injunctive relief
to its remedial arsenal in recent years.
The Board must demonstrate to a
United States district court "reason-
able cause" to believe respondent em-
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ployer or union has violated the Act
and that the requested injunctive re-
lief is "just and proper" either to
maintain the status quo or to prevent
a nullification of the Board's ultimate
remedial order. During calendar years
1980-83, the Board authorized 237
section 160(j) cases. Complete or sub-
stantial success was achieved in 87 per
cent of the cases that were processed
to conclusion. NLRB, General Coun-
sel, Report on Utilization of Section
160(j) Injunction Proceedings January
1, 1980 through December 31, 1983
(Memorandum GC 84-7, Apr. 23,
1984), reprinted in 116 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 128 (June 18, 1984) and 116
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 149 (June 25,
1984). This form of relief may be re-
quested in a variety of circumstances.
Those most relevant to this discussion
are:
* Employer interference with union
organizational campaigns (enjoining
violations and securing affirmative
order reinstating discriminatees);
e Employer subcontracting or other
changes to avoid bargaining obliga-
tions (affirmative restoration order);
* Employer undermining of incum-
bent bargaining representative by use
of threats or discrimination against
union leaders (enjoining unlawful
conduct and affirmative order rein-
stating discriminatees);
* Recognition of a minority union
and otherwise unlawfully assisting or
dominating a labor organization (en-
joining unlawful conduct, including
request for abrogation of collective
bargaining agreement);
o Mass picketing and union violence
(enjoining the misconduct);
o Employer refusal to permit access
to property to engage in protected ac-
tivity (affirmative order to gain access
requested); and
o Interference with access to the
Board's processes (enjoining section
158(a)(4) conduct to limit its chilling
effect on other employees). Id.
The ability of an employee to air fully before the Board a charge of an
unfair labor practice has been recognized as crucial in effectuating the
purposes of the Act, both to deter and remedy the commission of unfair
labor practices and to ensure "the functioning of the Act as an organic
whole." Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 739, 740
("rights secured by §157 of the Act" to employees "includ[e] ... the
right to utilize the Board's processes"); NLRB v. Industrial Union of
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, (because "[any coercion
used to discourage, retard, or defeat ... access [to the Board for reliefi
is beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization").
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. N.L.R.B.,
716 E2d 1249, 1259 (9th Cir. 1983).
